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Precedent and the content of the law:
Lessons from the evolution of groundwater law in early 20th century California
I:

Introduction
The scholarly study of judicial decision-making has evolved dramatically over time, as

legal scholarship has taken increasingly sophisticated approaches to understanding and modeling
judicial behavior. Traditional models painted judges as largely mechanical interpreters of the
law, or purely interested in promoting certain economic or social objectives.1 In recent days,
these models have been challenged by scholars operating in the law-and-economics tradition,
who have proposed models of judges as self-interested, rational actors with various personal
objectives operating under a variety of constraints.2 This development has permitted economists
and legal scholars to pose a richer set of testable hypotheses, enabling us to gain better insights
into both judge behavior and a variety of legal phenomena.3
In the process of revising our conception of judicial behavior, our conception of the role
of precedent in the judicial process has evolved as well. Historically, precedent has been viewed
by legal scholars as constraining judges from ruling in certain ways; namely, ways that are
inconsistent with existing doctrine as embodied in previous rulings on specific issues.4 The
recent move toward rational actor models of judges has subtly shifted this conception of
precedent. While not denying its constraining force, the new thinking views precedent as
providing a way for judges to economize on judicial effort when they enjoy doctrinal latitude,
allowing them to capitalize on the work of previous judges. This conclusion follows naturally
from a model that assumes that judges operate under binding time constraints, which generates
tradeoffs in terms of how much time and effort they devote to crafting individual opinions.

2

Unfortunately, in rational actor models the impact of precedent on judicial decisionmaking remains unclear because judicial latitude is itself endogenous to precedent, and we lack
general predictions on the nature of this endogeneity. It is common to view precedent as binding
on judges, particularly when existing cases are dense, targeted at a narrowly-defined issue, and
specific in the governing principles they lay out. However, in principle a body of precedent may
endow judges with broad latitude to craft new content, by providing varied analogies in the law,
as well as numerous exceptions to controlling legal doctrine.5 If so, under the new rational actor
models judges may be afforded more economizing opportunities and judicial preferences become
a stronger driver of the content and direction of the law. The question is: what is the exact nature
of the relationship between existing precedent and the opportunity for judges to exercise judicial
latitude?
This paper aims to advance our understanding of the impact of precedent on judicial
decision-making by examining the behavior of judges in complex doctrinal situations where
multiple governing principles for deciding cases are present. Not only is this the case where we
lack the greatest clarity in terms of being able to predict judicial behavior, it also probably
characterizes a great many issues. In the model to be presented shortly, judges have preferences
over judicial outcomes but writing opinions is costly, especially ones that go against existing
doctrine, so that judges may not necessarily take their (unconstrained) ideal position.6 Precedent
is modeled as potentially binding on judges but depending upon the circumstances, the presence
of multiple principles for deciding cases affords potentially greater latitude to judges to service
their own preferences for legal outcomes.
There are two implications of this analysis, one for the behavior of judges and the other
for the evolution of the law over time. First, rational actor judges will commonly have incentive
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to draw on related areas of the law when they are available and applicable to the case at hand.
This has the consequence of making existing precedent less binding and makes the law more a
reflection of judicial preferences than existing doctrinal principles that may on the surface appear
controlling. Second, when judges draw on legal principles from related areas, this can lead to a
convergence of doctrine. Legal principles governing seemingly different areas may assume
greater similarity as judges recognize and apply analogies from one area to the next. This paper
thus attempts to forge a connection between the decision-making of judges as rational actors and
the broader currents of doctrinal evolution.7
To illustrate these implications of the model, the paper adopts the strategy of examining a
specific legal situation where there is an exogenous shock that in effect relaxes the constraint of
existing precedent. This shock permits us to observe the court response to this relaxation of
precedent, and the direction of the law as a consequence. The specific situation examined is
groundwater law in California in the late-19th and early-20th centuries, when exogenous advances
in scientific understanding of groundwater hydrology clarified the similarities between
groundwater and surface water flows and reduced the cost to judges of applying legal analogies
from surface water law to groundwater disputes. As we shall see, these advances effectively
relaxed the constraints imposed by existing precedents in groundwater law, permitting judges to
exercise greater discretion in deciding which set of precedents to draw upon. As the model
predicts, the result was a convergence of the legal principles governing surface water and
groundwater.
II.

Rational actor judges, precedent, and economic change
On the surface, the models of judges respecting existing precedent and judges as self-

interested rational actors seem to be at fundamental odds with each other. In the one view,
4

judges confront a body of previous rulings and search for principles that seem to apply to the
case at hand. The rulings of previous judges stand front-and-center and are given enormous
deference, and the particular preferences of the ruling judge matter little in terms of deciding the
outcome of the case. In the other view, the preferences of the judge are everything: preferences
for interest in promoting efficient use of resources, advancing particular political objectives,
minimizing opinion-writing effort, personal status, reputation, and so forth. In the judge-asrational-actor model, previous rulings seem either largely incidental or merely an opportunity for
judges to reduce their workload by invoking the work of others.
In actuality, the decision-making models can be reconciled by viewing precedent as a
constraint that is more-or-less binding on judges depending upon circumstances. It should first
be recognized that what constitutes precedent may seem clear-cut but in fact, it can be quite
fuzzy. As Frederick Schauer and others have pointed out, the seemingly simple notion of
“treating like issues alike” raises a number of practical issues that judges must confront in
deciding whether to follow precedent.8 No two disputes are ever exactly alike, so one important
question is that of degree: how alike do two different disputes have to be to warrant the same
judicial treatment? And given that disputes may share a number of different characteristics,
which characteristics are relevant for an appropriate determination of the relative rights of the
parties involved? And among the characteristics that are deemed relevant, should some be given
greater weight than others? All of this means that there may well be a significant amount of
indeterminacy in precisely what constitutes precedent in any particular case.
But beyond the fact that there is generally an irreducible amount of uncertainty in what
constitutes precedent, certain other factors may make it even more of an open question. A key
factor is changing economic, social, or technological conditions, which may make previous
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rulings appear less applicable to the new circumstances. In the 1940’s, for example, advances in
scientific understanding of fetal development led courts to begin to hold individuals responsible
for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries.9 Similarly, the scientific advances in understanding
hydrology in the late 19th century made existing groundwater principles less relevant, which
lowered the costs to judges of striking out in new directions.10 As a more recent example, traditional common law used to treat adolescents as responsible adults in cases involving criminal
offenses, but this changed in the 2000’s as advances in brain science led courts to distinguish
adolescent from adult criminal behavior in terms of culpability.11
With this notion of precedent in mind, a simple model will clarify the impact of precedent
on judges, and will permit examination of the impact of doctrine in related areas of the law. For
the purposes of the following discussion, it will be assumed that the court consists of a single
judge, so that intra-court dynamics among judges can be ignored. Consider an existing legal
doctrine regarding a particular issue, such as groundwater law. It is assumed that the doctrine
can be summarized in terms of a single attribute X. The judge has well-defined preferences over
different values of X, expressed in a utility function U(X). Assume that initially, legal doctrine
takes on the value X0, which is the judge’s initial ideal (utility-maximizing) position. Furthermore, assume that the judge’s utility declines with distance from this position.12 This gives rise
to a utility “hill” for the judge over different values of X(Figure 1). In this initial equilibrium,
there is no tendency for the judge to move from this original doctrinal position X0.
< Figure 1 about here >
Suppose now that there is a change in economic conditions, which results in a shift in the
judge’s ideal position.13 This is represented in Figure 1 as a (rightward) shift in the judge’s
utility hill, now centered on X’. This induces a shift in the judge’s position, what I will term XJ.
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If there are no other considerations, there will be a predicted wholesale move in doctrine to the
judge’s new ideal position, so that XJ = X’. Two factors, however, may enter into the judge’s
rule-making calculus, both leading to an incomplete adjustment to the new position. First, the
judge may experience costs in writing a new opinion that deviates from the existing doctrine X0.
Assume that these opinion-writing costs are an increasing function of the distance between the
new opinion XJ and existing doctrine X0. These costs are represented in the following cost
function C = C(XJ – X0). Assume that C’ > 0 and C’’ > 0, so that marginal opinion-writing costs
are also increasing in the distance (XJ – X0). Expressing U and C in the same(dollar) terms, we
can then derive the judge’s net utility function: NU = U(X) – C(XJ – X0). Because C is
increasing in the distance between XJ and X0, it is easily shown that XJ < X’. That is, faced with
opinion-writing costs, the judge will not move all the way to the (gross) utility-maximizing
position X’.
An additional factor that may affect the judge’s behavior is precedent. Depending upon
a number of factors, existing precedent may be more or less binding. These factors include the
degree that existing doctrine is settled, the influence of judicial norms, and the particular
economic factors at play. To model precedent, I define a weighting parameter β, where β ε (0,
1). Then the bindingness of precedent is embodied in the following constraint: XJ ≤ β X0 + (1 –
β) X’. That is, β is a parameter that weights the importance of existing doctrine versus the new
ideal position generated by changing economic conditions. This constraint represents the fact
that depending upon the value of β, there will be just so far that the judge may stray from the
current position X0. If β = 1, then precedent is completely binding and the judge will simply
stick to existing doctrine, setting XJ = X0. If β = 0, then the judge is completely free to choose
her ideal (net) position, regardless of precedent. Intermediate values of β, of course, reflect

7

varying degrees of bindingness. In Figure 1, this constraint is represented as the point A between
X0 and X’. Given this constraint, the judge is free to choose any position at or to the left of A.
In any particular instance, whether existing precedent will actually be binding on this
judge depends upon her preferences over judicial outcomes, her opinion-writing costs, and the
bindingness of precedent. Formally, the judge optimizes with respect to XJ and λ in the
following Lagrangean function:
£ = U(XJ) – C(XJ – X0) + λ[XJ – β X0 – (1 – β) X’]

(1)

Then the first order conditions are:
UX’ – CX’ + λ ≤ 0

(2)

XJ – β X0 – (1 – β) X’ ≤ 0

(3)

The first order conditions then yield two possibilities: (a)precedent is non-binding(λ = 0), in
which case the predicted outcome is the judge’s (net) ideal position; or (b)precedent is binding(λ
> 0), in which case we obtain the corner solution at point A.14 Notice that precedent will be nonbinding only if β is sufficiently small and/or the cost of opinion-writing is sufficiently large.
To see the impact of related doctrine on judicial outcomes, let us model doctrine
regarding two resources, each with one attribute: X and Y. In this case, the initial position
consists of the point (X0, Y0) in Figure 2. The preferences of the judge are now represented with
concentric utility circles, with utility declining with (Euclidean) distance from the initial position.
In this case, a change in economic conditions is reflected as a movement in X – Y space, with the
preferences of the judge moving accordingly. Assuming initially that the doctrines regarding X
and Y are considered by the judge to be completely unrelated, the utility function of the judge is
completely separable in X and Y: U(X, Y) = UX(X) + UY(Y), so that the cross-partial derivatives
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UXY and UYX equal 0. Similarly, for two completely unrelated doctrines, the opinion-writing
cost function will also be separable in X and Y: C(X, Y) = CX(XJ – X0) + CY(YJ – Y0), where
CXY = CYX = 0. Then the judge’s Lagrangean function becomes:
£ = [UX(XJ) + UY(YJ)] – [CX(XJ – X0) + CY(YJ – Y0)] + λX[XJ – βX X0 – (1 – βX) X’]
+ λY[YJ – βY Y0 – (1 – βY) Y’]

(4)

In this function, there are two bindingness parameters βX and βY, reflecting the fact that existing
precedent may bind differentially on doctrine regarding the two resources.
< Figure 2 about here >
Under these conditions, it should be apparent that the individual optimizing conditions
with regard to X and Y mirror precisely the optimizing condition in the case of one resource,
yielding, for example, the same first order condition with regard to XJ as in the single-resource
case. Similarly for Y. Since X and Y are (doctrinally) unrelated, a change in economic
conditions that affects the judge’s ideal position for X may have little if any effect on her ideal
position for Y, and vice versa. The case where there is zero effect on Y is illustrated in Figure 2,
where after the change, the judge’s ideal position is now (X’, Y0). As in the single-resource
case, the judge maximizes utility by either choosing her ideal (net-of-cost-of-opinion writing)
position(precedent non-binding), or point A(precedent binding).15 In other words, existing
doctrine with regard to the other resource has no impact on judicial rule-making when the other
resource is completely unrelated to the one at hand.
To illustrate the effect of related doctrine, suppose now that the two resources X and Y
are related in terms of treatment under the law. In this case, changes in economic conditions are
more likely to affect the judge’s new preferences over outcomes in both the X and Y directions.
In Figure 3, this is shown as a movement in the ideal position of the judge from (X0, Y0) to (X’,
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Y’). As before, the judge incurs opinion-writing costs as well as potentially binding precedent,
now for both X and Y(the vertical and horizontal lines in Figure 3). However, the fact that the
two resources are related in the law means that the judge may be able to invoke precedent from
previous rulings for either resource. In the extreme case, precedent for one resource applies with
complete force to the other resource, and vice versa. In this case, the precedent constraint
becomes:
[XJ ≤ βX X0 + (1 – βX) X’] OR [YJ ≤ βY Y0 + (1 – βY) Y’]

(5)

Faced with this choice, the utility-maximizing judge in Figure 3 would invoke precedent from
resource Y and move to point A. In short, the presence of related doctrine may make existing
precedent less binding, to the extent that precedent on related doctrine provides judges with more
leeway in serving their preferences over different rules.
< Figure 3 about here >
To see the concrete implications of this analysis, the remainder of this paper will develop
a particular example – the evolution of groundwater law in early 20th century California – which
will be discussed and documented at length in the next two sections. In this example, surface
water and groundwater were initially considered completely different resources, so that doctrine
with regard to one, in the form of legal rules regarding resolution of disputes, was considered
largely immaterial in influencing doctrine with regard to the other. In this initial state, changes
in surface water law would not affect groundwater doctrine at all, as in Figure 2. However,
subsequent advances in scientific understanding of groundwater flows led judges to perceive
groundwater and surface water to be similar resources. The model predicts that a judge might
exploit this new understanding by applying existing rules governing surface water to govern
disputes over groundwater, as in Figure 3. The advance in scientific understanding of
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groundwater flows thus had two related consequences: it permitted the courts to relax the
constraint imposed by existing groundwater precedent, and it caused the legal doctrines
regarding groundwater and surface water to more closely mirror one another.
III.

19th century precursors
Since statehood, California has been an English common law jurisdiction, and its judicial

rulings regarding water have reflected the perceptible influence of English common law doctrine.
A key reflection of this influence was the early adoption by the courts of the principles of
riparian law to govern the acquisition of, and resolution of disputes over, surface water rights. In
a nutshell, riparian water rights are created through land ownership, which entitles one to the use
of water in physically adjacent rivers and streams. Also important is the fact that under riparian
law, surface water exists for the benefit of the lands where it naturally occurs, which has meant
that the water could itself only be used on the physically adjacent lands, the so-called
appurtenance principle. In disputes over surface water use, all users along a river enjoy roughly
co-equal rights, with each right-holder permitted to use only an amount of water that is
“reasonable” given the needs of other users. This reasonable use standard has proved to be a
highly elastic one, and what constitutes reasonable use in any particular dispute has typically
been a matter for the courts to decide.16
At the same time, the early California courts also developed and applied an alternative set
of principles to govern water use and development in circumstances where traditional riparian
principles could not adequately service the demands of economic growth. These alternative
principles – embodied in the so-called doctrine of prior appropriation – apply the principle of
first possession to govern both the acquisition of surface water rights and the resolution of
disputes over these rights. Under this principle, surface water rights are allocated on a first11

come, first-served basis, with prior(senior) appropriators enjoying rights that are superior to
subsequent(junior) appropriators. Practically speaking, this distinction becomes especially
important in times of low surface flow, when junior appropriators are required to cut back their
use before senior appropriators are required to. Finally, unlike riparian law, under appropriative
law water may be diverted and used at locations remote from the surface sources where it
naturally occurs. These seemingly incompatible doctrines have coexisted uneasily ever since
statehood, and have come to be known as the California Doctrine – California’s unique
contribution to western surface water law.17
Early groundwater law in California reflected, in some respects, the surface water
distinction between riparian and appropriative rights, as embodied in the principles of English
common law. The early courts believed that groundwater could exist in two distinct forms: as
part of a well-defined sub-surface flow, or free sub-surface water with no clear patterns of flow.
Such a distinction is seen, for example, in the early case of Hanson v. McCue, which involved a
dispute between two groundwater users. In Hanson, the Court drew a sharp distinction between
groundwater “flowing in defined channels” and groundwater “formed by the ordinary
percolations of water in the soil,” disconnected from any flowing stream.18 When groundwater
flowed in well-defined channels under the surface, Hanson argued, it was really no different
from water that flowed in well-defined channels on the surface. The mere fact that water
happened to be underground should therefore not affect the legal principles that should govern its
allocation:
“Underground currents of water, flowing in defined channels, are known to exist in
considerable volume, particularly in limestone regions; and where their existence
is shown, there is no doubt, either upon reason or authority, that the rules of law
which govern the use of similar streams flowing upon the surface of the earth, are
applicable to them.”
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This led to its conclusion that no one should be permitted to “intercept its natural descent to the
lands of the proprietor below,” as such a stream was “in a greater or less degree a fertilizer of the
land through which it flows.” Though Hanson never used the term riparian, the riparian
principle that all users are entitled to the flow, and the riparian philosophy that water exists for
the benefit of the land through which it flows, are both evident in its treatment of well-defined
underground flows. Subsequent rulings through the remainder of the century would uphold this
doctrinal treatment of non-percolating groundwater.19
However, when groundwater did not flow in a well-defined channel, Hanson held that it
was to be governed by the English common law doctrine of cujus es solum, sometimes referred
to as absolute ownership. Under the principle of absolute ownership, land ownership entitles the
owner to all of the resources found under the surface contained within the perimeter of the
boundaries of the parcel. In other words, the surface limits of the parcel are projected straight
down, and everything within those downward projections belong to the owner of the parcel, with
virtually no restrictions on how the resources can be mined and exploited by the owner. As
Hanson put it:
“Water filtrating or percolating in the soil belongs to the owner of the freehold-like the rocks and minerals found there. It exists there free from the usufructuary
right of others, which is to be respected by the owner of an estate through which a
defined stream of water is found to flow. The owner may appropriate the
percolations and filtrations as he may choose, and turn them to profit if he can.”
In terms of the potential for third-party impacts, legal rules that treat groundwater like
coal and other sub-surface minerals would seem unlikely to produce efficient groundwater
development. Today, we know that unlike extractions of coal on one’s own property, extractions
of groundwater can inflict third-party impacts through the lateral subsurface movement of
groundwater. Groundwater extractions generate a localized reduction in sub-surface water
pressures, inducing lateral flows from surrounding higher-pressure areas in order to restore
13

equilibrium in the aquifer. The practical effect can be a generalized lowering of local water
tables, causing existing wells in surrounding areas to dry up or to require their owners to expend
extra energy pumping from greater depths. Alternatively, if groundwater is flowing laterally (for
example, if groundwater recharge occurs predominantly from one direction: say, the mountains),
then groundwater extraction can intercept recharge to the downflow side, with a comparable
adverse impact on groundwater tables. By creating an exclusion right to groundwater, the 19th
century California courts were for all intents and purposes providing the right for any landowner
who wished to pump groundwater to inflict costs on his neighbors.
How do we interpret these courts’ willingness to treat percolating groundwater in this
way? As I documented previously, an important factor was the primitive state of scientific
understanding of groundwater flows in the 19th century, which made it difficult for judges to
assess when, or even if, groundwater pumping was in fact inflicting a third-party impact in any
given instance.20 Given this lack of scientific knowledge, it seems likely that judges adopted
what seemed like appropriate analogies in the common law, treating groundwater like coal and
other stationary sub-surface resources.21
The question of what did constitute a well-defined stream was confronted head-on toward
the end of the century in City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, another case involving a diversion to
the detriment of a groundwater interest. This may well have been the first case in California
involving a well-defined underground stream, as the Court described it as a “pioneer case.”22
According to the Court, in order for there to be a well-defined stream, the groundwater had to
“flow in known and well-defined channels, so as to constitute regular and constant streams.”23
Given that it did, maintained the Court, the plaintiff was entitled to sue to enjoin a diversion if it
took place “under the same circumstances as would enable him to recover if the stream had been
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wholly above ground.” Echoing Hanson, the Court again ruled that there was no legal
distinction to be made between well-defined streams regardless of whether they were above or
below the surface. In this case, and in sharp contrast to Gould, the Court enjoined the diversion,
ruling that:
“[T]he defendants ha(d) no right to carry any of the waters of the Los Angeles river
off of their riparian land for use on land not riparian, nor can they sell it for use on
land not riparian; and all surplus waters must be turned back into the stream.”
[Superior Ct. instruction VII, approved by Court. [City of LA v. Pomeroy, p. 621]
Thus, at the turn of the 20th century, the position of the California courts was sharply
different on percolating and non-percolating groundwater, in essence because they were
governed by completely different English common law doctrines. Percolating groundwater,
defined as not part of a well-defined flow, was governed by the doctrine of absolute ownership.
As a result, very few restrictions, including restrictions on exports from a groundwater basin,
were imposed on how it could be developed and used. On the other hand, non-percolating
groundwater, which was defined as occurring in a well-defined flow, was governed by riparian
law, including its principle of appurtenance. During this early period, then, restrictions on
exports of groundwater occurred in principle not as a way to mitigate third-party impacts.
Rather, they occurred because according to riparian law, water was to be used for the benefit of
the land through which it flowed.
IV.

Katz v. Walkinshaw and its aftermath
The famous Katz ruling in 1902/03 is widely recognized as effecting a fundamental

doctrinal change in the legal treatment of groundwater in California, but it needs to be stressed
that the case only addressed percolating groundwater. In Katz, the plaintiff was a landowner
who was pumping from an underlying aquifer to irrigate her lands, when the defendant came
along and began pumping water for sale to others outside the aquifer. In the course of testimony,
15

it was established that the groundwater in question did not flow in well-defined channels and was
therefore clearly percolating groundwater. Not surprisingly, the defendant, in justifying its
extractions of groundwater to the detriment of the plaintiff, argued that California groundwater
law was based on absolute ownership and thus, it had an unrestricted right to do as it pleased
with the groundwater pumped from its land. Justice Temple, writing for the Court, disagreed
with the defendant’s position, ruling that groundwater use was subject to reasonable use
restrictions. Thus, in Katz the California courts moved away from the principle of absolute
ownership, for the first time imposing substantive governance restrictions on the use of
percolating groundwater. Subsequent rulings upheld the new rule established by Katz.24
On the surface, Katz would seem to be a purely practical ruling, in which the courts were
reacting to increased congestion, and increasingly frequent third-party impacts, in local aquifers.
In this sense, the story appears to be very much in the tradition of early economic accounts of the
evolution of property rights expounded by Demsetz and others who stress increasing resource
value relative to enforcement costs and the internalization of externalities.25 However, more
precise analogies are provided by recent accounts that stress the importance of transaction costs
in the evolution of legal rules. There are, for example, some striking parallels between this
doctrinal shift in California groundwater law and previous developments in both eastern and
western surface water law. Carol Rose has argued, for example, that the emergence of
reasonable use restrictions on riparian water use in the eastern United States in the early 19th
century may be interpreted as economizing on the transaction costs of negotiating over thirdparty impacts during a time period when eastern waterways were becoming increasingly
congested.26 Similarly, I have argued that the imposition of reasonableness restrictions on
riparians in disputes with appropriators in late 19th century California also mirrors a similar
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pattern of transaction costs.27 The discussion so far seems to indicate that groundwater law in
California assumed a very similar trajectory: reasonable use appeared when groundwater basins
became increasingly congested, raising transaction costs among individual owners of negotiating
over the third-party impact.
However, this essentially instrumentalist explanation ignores the doctrinal currents that
governed surface water use at the time, as well as some fundamental holdings of the Katz ruling
itself, and subsequent rulings governing percolating groundwater. While Katz took great pains to
argue that the common law was highly malleable in adapting to different conditions, it is also
clear that it considered there to be limits to its malleability. Katz blasted the absolute ownership
doctrine for providing no protection for investments in groundwater development:
“[I]f the rule for which they[defendants] contend is the law, or no law, of the land,
[defendants and others in a similar position] will be constantly threatened with
danger of utter destruction of the valuable enterprises and systems of water-works
which they control, and that all new enterprises of the same sort will be subject to
the same peril. They will have absolutely no protection in law against others having
stronger pumps, deeper wells, or a more favorable situation, who can thereby take
from them unlimited quantities of the water, reaching to the entire supply, and
without regard to the place / of use. We cannot perceive how a doctrine offering so
little protection to the investments in and product of such enterprises, and offering
so much temptation to others to capture the water on which they depend, can tend
to promote developments in the future or preserve those already made, and,
therefore, we do not believe that public policy or a regard for the general welfare
demands the doctrine.” [Katz(Shaw), pp. 133-34]
However, it refused to take the logical next step of providing a secure property right for these
investments, such as a priority rule. Instead, it fell back on what it recognized to be the secondbest solution of reasonable use, arguing merely that it was better than the existing absolute
ownership rule:
“The doctrine of reasonable use, on the other hand, affords some measure of
protection to property now existing, and greater justification for the attempt to
make new developments. It limits the right of others to such amount of water as
may be necessary for some useful purpose in connection with the land from which
it is taken. … So far as the active interference of others is concerned, therefore, the
17

danger to such undertakings is much less, and the incentive to development much
greater, from the doctrine of reasonable use than from the contrary rule.”
(Emphasis added)
Why did it stop here? The answer appears to be that it searched for and applied existing
common law principles – namely, riparian law – to allocate rights to percolating groundwater.
The analogy to riparian law is observed very clearly in this passage in the way that it invokes the
appurtenance principle: that the extent of the right should be limited to the amount useful “in
connection with the land from which it is taken.” Apparently, it felt constrained to apply the
analogies of the common law, even if it meant less-than-secure property rights and the tying of
groundwater to the lands from which it was taken.
The intellectual allegiance to riparian principles as applied to percolating groundwater is
seen even more clearly in the 1909 case of Hudson v. Dailey. In Hudson, the plaintiff was a
riparian allegedly damaged by groundwater pumping from water that fed the surface stream upon
which the plaintiff relied. Unlike the plaintiff, the defendants were not in a position physically
riparian to the stream, but the Court affirmed an appeals court ruling that they were entitled to
reasonable use of the waters despite the fact that the plaintiff had established long-standing use.
“The owner of land has a natural right to the reasonable use of the waters
percolating therein ... His ownership of the land carries with it all the natural
advantages of its situation, and the right to a reasonable use of the land and
everything it contains, limited only by the operation of the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas. It is upon this principle that the law of riparian rights is
founded, giving to each owner the right to use the waters of the stream upon his
riparian land, but limiting him to a reasonable share thereof, as against other
riparian owners thereon. We think the same application of the principle should be
made to the case of percolating waters feeding the stream and necessary to its
continued flow. There is no rational ground for any distinction between such
percolating waters and the waters in the gravels immediately beneath and directly
supporting the surface flow, and no reason for applying a different rule to the two
classes, with respect to such rights, if, indeed, the two classes can be distinguished
at all.” (Emphasis added)
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In Hudson, then, we observe the convergence of the laws governing surface water and
percolating groundwater, likely fueled by the increasing awareness by the courts that in terms of
physical properties, groundwater and surface water were really not very different at all.
More evidence of the importance of surface water doctrine is provided by other aspects of
the Katz ruling. Specifically, it is not widely recognized that Katz introduced an important
temporal issue into California groundwater law. In Katz, the plaintiff landowner was present and
already pumping prior to the diversions by the defendant exporter. Correlative rights, it argued,
applied only to overlying landowners with respect to each others’ rights. In contrast, when the
landowner was already using the groundwater prior to a subsequent attempt to export, Katz ruled
that the prior landowner enjoyed a right superior to that of the exporter:
“Under the decision in this case the rights of [landowners who have used water on
their overlying lands prior to the exporter’s attempt to export] are paramount to that
of one who takes the water to distant land; but the landowner's right extends only
to the quantity of water that is necessary for use on his land, and the
appropriator may take the surplus.” [Katz(Shaw), pp. 135-36]
Thus, in disputes between exporters and prior landowners, Katz seemed to be describing some
species of right based on first possession. Indeed, except for absence of specific quantification
of the landowner’s right, the above passage reads very much like the landowner owned an
appropriative right to underlying groundwater vis-à-vis any exporter who might come after. This
language created some confusion at the time, leading some, including knowledgeable observers
such as the eminent water lawyer Samuel Wiel, to conclude that the import of Katz was to apply
first possession appropriative rights to percolating groundwater.28
It merits emphasis, however, that the right created by Katz was decidedly not an
appropriative right. For one thing, as we have seen, the groundwater right created by Katz was
not to a specific quantity but rather, was termed in vague language as the amount that was
“necessary” for the overlying landowner. Elsewhere in the ruling, the Katz court made it clear
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that what it meant by this was the amount that was put to reasonable use for some beneficial
purpose.29 Such a definition does not provide the tenure security of a quantified first-possession
right. For another thing, the Katz ruling specified that the right of the overlying landowner was
confined to the amount that was used on the land itself, which is a restriction that is not generally
imposed on appropriative rights. Indeed, aside from the attention paid to the relative priorities of
the parties in the above passage from Katz, the groundwater right it created had much of the
character of a riparian right. Riparian law does not define quantities, requires water be used on
adjacent lands, and over time has come to impose reasonableness limits on the individual right.
The right of overlying landowners created by Katz contained all of these features.
Like many water rulings, Katz only ruled on the fact pattern at hand, where the
landowner was first and the exporter came afterwards. It therefore did not take a position on the
reverse fact pattern – where the overlying landowner was not first – leaving this question to
future courts. This question was addressed five years later in Burr v. Maclay.30 Burr was
another percolating groundwater case that involved a complex set of circumstances including
multiple tracts of land at various stages of groundwater development. However, on one of the
tracts of land, the fact pattern of Katz was reversed: the exporter diverted prior to use by the
landowner. On this point, the Burr court ruled that the exporter could take and use the water
until such time as the landowner wished to start. At that point, however, the exporter would have
to cut back and from then on, the landowner’s right would be superior to that of the exporter.
I will argue shortly that of all the various possible fact patterns involving groundwater
users, the ruling in Burr is the least susceptible to a straightforward interpretation, so let us
examine the Burr court’s reasoning more closely. The question is: Why should an exporter who
is prior in time to a landowner have to lose its right to the groundwater when the landowner starts
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using the water? He certainly would not have to under appropriative law, and under riparian law,
the parties would be required to share. Burr argued in effect that the restriction was justified
because the landowner had purchased his land with the expectation of being able to use the
groundwater on the land, and that the groundwater was what gave the land its value:
“It appears from the findings that the existence of this underlying water was known
… and that the plaintiff bought his tracts … because of its situation with respect to
that water and relying upon said natural water supply and that without this water
the land is of little value. Under these circumstances it does not seem reasonable or
just to adopt a rule that would deprive the buyer of such land of the principal benefit
of his purchase and the land of its chief element of value.”31
Thus, in Burr, we hear echoes of the riparian principle that water exists for the benefit of the land
through which it flows.
One remaining temporal fact pattern concerns two claimants, each of whom wish to
export groundwater from a local basin. Katz had discussed this issue, citing analogies to
appropriations of surface water. However, as this fact pattern was not before the Katz court, this
holding remained dictum until 1921, when a ruling was made, in San Bernardino v. Riverside.
In this complex case, both parties were overlying landowners who wished to export groundwater
to their respective cities for municipal use. The Court ruled that when the waters were not to be
used on overlying lands, claimants were considered to be appropriators and disputes were to be
resolved on the basis of temporal priority. Consequently, overlying land ownership conferred no
special ownership status when the groundwater was not to be used on overlying lands:
“We understand the true rule to be that when a conflict arises between two
appropriators of water, and their rights are otherwise equal, the prior appropriator
will prevail so far as the conflict extends. It necessarily follows that in an action to
quiet his title the prior appropriator is entitled to have his prior right declared to be
superior to that of subsequent appropriators.” [San Bernardino v. Riverside]
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This holding is, of course, precisely the rule governing appropriations of surface water, extended
to include groundwater, which the courts had come to regard as no different from surface water
in any essential respects.
By 1921, then, the Court had ruled on various fact patterns regarding percolating
groundwater involving overlying landowners and exporters. The overall pattern of rulings is
illustrated in Figure 4. There are several things to notice here. First, in disputes involving
landowners where groundwater was not to be exported, the Court created allocation principles
that had strong analogies in riparian law, especially appurtenance, non-quantification of right,
and reasonable use. In effect, parties to disputes of this kind enjoyed something very much like
riparian rights to the underlying groundwater. This set of rulings acted to unify groundwater law
in the case of competing overlying users, making it largely irrelevant whether groundwater
happened to be percolating or non-percolating. Second, in disputes involving exporters the
Court applied temporal priority principles, creating a doctrine that for all intents and purposes
decreed appropriative rights to groundwater. Here again, the courts adopted allocation
principles found in existing surface water law to govern analogous groundwater conditions.
< Figure 4 about here >
It was in disputes between overlying landowners and exporters that we observe a perhaps
surprising and less explicable pattern of rulings. When the landowner came first, the Court gave
it priority, and the exporter had to take what was left over. As I have argued, there was not a
perfect analogy here to an appropriative right for various reasons, but the emphasis on temporal
priority nevertheless gave it the flavor of an appropriative right. On the other hand, when the
exporter came first and the landowner was not using the water, the export was not denied, but it
had to give way to the landowner’s use if it was ever asserted. Both of these holdings thus came
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down to the principle that the exporter was only entitled to whatever was available in surplus
above and beyond the needs of landowners within the basin.
In order to understand these disputes over percolating groundwater between landowners
and exporters, it should be recognized that these disputes had strong analogies in surface water
disputes between riparians and appropriators, of which there was a long, rich history in
California water law.32 Beginning with a series of cases in the 1850’s, a number of rulings
involving a dispute between a riparian and an appropriator over the waters of a surface waterway
established the following principles in the case of such disputes. Upstream appropriators were
enjoined from diverting water to the detriment of a riparian landowner who had been present
first. However, doing so was not actionable if the appropriator only diverted the surplus waters
of the stream because, by definition, such diversions would not damage the riparians.33 It will be
recognized that the principle arrived at in Katz and followed in subsequent rulings closely
mirrors this principle for groundwater.
Regarding disputes over surface water where the appropriator preceded the riparian, the
courts appear to have favored the appropriator, except in cases where it was found that the
appropriation was invalid because a beneficial use had not been made of the water.34 This last
instance, then, appears on the surface to comprise an asymmetry in the surface- and groundwater
law treatments of this genre of dispute. However, it should be mentioned that the pattern of facts
in the surface water cases I have managed to find are not completely analogous to that in Burr v.
Maclay, in the following important sense. Recall that in Burr, even though the overlying
landowner started using water after the exporter, it had established, in the eyes of the Court,
credible intention to use the water prior to the arrival of the exporter. Given this, it seems
sensible that the landowner was entitled to the same extent of groundwater right as if had
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actually started using the groundwater first. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the courts
would uphold riparian surface water claims against prior appropriators, as doing so would
provide all sorts of incentives for opportunistic behavior by riparian claimants.
Taken together, all of these holdings may be interpreted as having the effect of
prioritizing the within-basin use of water, encouraging the water to stay where it was. When the
exporter came first, the added consideration for the courts was apparently the value of promoting
maximum usage of the available water. The courts were not about to stand in the way of exports
of water for use when the alternative was that the water would remain in the basin, unused.
Overall, however, exporters were heavily disadvantaged under this system of groundwater
allocation principles. Whenever landowners were already present in a basin, exporters had to
think twice before committing to investments in diversion facilities, knowing that their claims
could be preempted at any time by increased use within the basin.
V:

Conclusions
Like everyone else, judges are human and thus largely self-interested, and the recent

generation of models of judges as rational actors have been fruitful in providing rich predictions
both for how judges will behave under various conditions and the consequences of that behavior
both for the law and for judicial procedure. In the process, a key component of the common-law
tradition – precedent – has come to assume more of the flavor of an instrument of economizing
behavior rather than a constraint on that behavior. This paper adds to the discussion of the role
of precedent in judicial decision-making by bringing back the traditional conception of precedent
as constraint and modelling judges as operating with varying degrees of freedom in the face of
that constraint, depending upon the richness and complexity of available doctrine. Under certain
conditions, such as obtained in early 20th century groundwater law in California, the availability
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of alternative governing principles can act to effectively ease the constraint of precedent, leaving
more room for judges to pursue their objectives. In California, it was possible to trace this
evolution by observing the emergence of new scientific understanding of groundwater flows and
the associated convergence of surface- and groundwater law.
It should be noted that the result of all this was a movement toward a common set of
principles governing surface- and groundwater, not necessarily efficient law governing both.
The analogies to surface water provided by the new scientific understanding moved groundwater
law in that direction but no further: it did not eliminate certain inherent inefficiencies in both
doctrines, such as favoring landowners over exporters, which effectively tied rights to the
originating basins. At the time, this may not have made much difference in terms of efficiency
but over time, perpetuating this principle carried the potential for major inefficiencies, to the
extent that high-value water use activities subsequently migrated to other sectors and geographic
areas.
It is useful to note the distinction between what occurred in California and the predictions
of standard economic models of property rights evolution in the tradition of Harold Demsetz,
Terry Anderson and P.J. Hill, and others. In these standard models, property rights to a resource
become increasingly individualized and well-defined as its value increases, its use generates
greater external impacts, and property rights become less costly to enforce. In the case of early
California groundwater law, all of these things were arguably occurring but the court response
was not to create individualized property rights in groundwater but rather, to draw analogies to
existing doctrine. This speaks to the power of precedent as a mediating factor in the evolution of
new property rights.
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The evidence presented here also speaks to a longstanding debate among legal scholars
over the appropriate economic interpretation of changes in water law over time. On the one
hand, some legal scholars have emphasized the long-term continuity of the common law,
stressing the importance to judges of being consistent with received doctrine.35 On the other
hand, others have emphasized the extreme malleability of the common law in responding to
changing economic conditions.36 Under this view, water law develops in response to changes in
economic conditions and may evolve in such a way that supports improved water allocation.
The early-20th century experience of groundwater law suggests that economic change matters,
particularly when it generates clear and demonstrable third-party impacts in the use of
groundwater. At the same time, the particular changes in groundwater law that were set in place
occurred within a doctrinal framework using established, longstanding allocation principles.
Thus, the overall sense could easily be one of legal continuity, when the changes were occurring
in response to practical instrumentalist factors, including changing economic conditions and
advances in scientific understanding.
The role of scientific advance is likely to be pertinent in understanding subsequent
developments in groundwater law in California after the period investigated here, as well as
elsewhere. Some recent studies have concluded that in many jurisdictions, current groundwater
law reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of groundwater hydrology. This fact has resulted in
some states, including California, treating groundwater and surface water as hydrologically
unrelated. 37 This conclusion obviously does not comport with the story told here, where judges
were highly cognizant of the connection and parallels between surface water and groundwater
flows and consciously incorporated this understanding into their rulings. Future research will
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investigate how and why this legal distinction between surface water and groundwater law
emerged in California.
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